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This paper investigates the output effects of IMF-supported stabilization programs, especially 
those introduced at the time of a severe balance of payments/currency crisis. Using a panel data set 
over the 1975-97 period and covering 67 developing and emerging-market economies (with 461 
IMF stabilization programs and 160 currency crises), we find that currency crises—even after 
controlling for macroeconomic developments, political and regional factors—significantly reduce 
output growth for 1-2 years. Output growth is also lower (0.7 percentage points annually) during 
IMF-stabilization programs, but it appears that growth generally slows prior to implementation of 
the program. Moreover, programs coinciding with recent balance of payments or currency crises do 
not appear to further damage short-run growth prospects. Countries participating in IMF programs 
significantly reduce domestic credit growth, but no effect is found on budget policy. Applying this 
model to the collapse of output in East Asia following the 1997 crisis, we find that the unexpected 
(forecast error) collapse of output in Malaysia—where an IMF-program was not followed—was 
similar in magnitude to those countries adopting IMF programs (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and 
Thailand).  2 
1.  Introduction 
There is considerable debate over the output and employments effects of IMF-supported 
stabilization programs. This controversy seems especially heated for countries facing acute balance 
of payments problems and currency crises, as witnessed in 1997 in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand 
and elsewhere. Stiglitz (2000), for example, supports critics of the IMF who argue “…the IMF’s 
economic ‘remedies’ often make things worse—turning slowdowns into recessions and recessions 
into depressions.” Some academic work also reaches this conclusion. Bordo and Schwartz (2000), 
for example, conclude, “…the recent spate of [IMF] rescues may be the case of the medicine doing 
more harm than good” (p. 60).
1 Similar statements by other leading economists are commonplace. 
Despite these strong statements about the value of recent IMF programs, no consensus has 
emerged about the impact of these programs on the real side of the economy.
2 Most empirical 
studies using panel data sets and regression techniques find that IMF-supported programs improve 
the balance of payments and current account  (e.g. Khan, 1990; Conway, 1994; Bagci and Perraudin, 
1997; Bordo and Schwartz, 2000). This is not surprising since a key purpose of the IMF is “…to 
give confidence to members by making the Fund’s resources temporarily available to them under 
adequate safeguards, thus providing them with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their 
balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international 
prosperity” (IMF Articles of Agreement, Article I (v)).  
Views on the ultimate output and employment effects of IMF programs, however, appear 
much more divergent than on the balance of payments effects. On the surface, it may seem odd that 
countries would choose to participate in an IMF stabilization program if it were not in their best 
interests to do so. That is, participation in a program would presumably be unlikely if the output 
costs were perceived to be particularly large, outweighing the benefits arising from improvement in 
the balance of payments, continued access to credit markets and so on. Stiglitz (2000) and others 
                                                                 
1  Part of the criticism against the IMF is that it contributes to moral hazard by creating the expectation of bailouts 
(implicit debt guarantees) whenever countries face balance of payments problems. Empirical evidence on this point is 
mixed. For example, Dreher and Vaubel (2001) find support for moral hazard associated with IMF programs, while 
Lane and Phillips (2000) do not.  See Willett (2000) for a recent review and evaluation of the literature on the debate 
surrounding the role of the IMF. 
 
2  There is a large literature reviewing the effects of IMF-supported stabilization programs. See, for example, Beveridge 
and Kelly (1980), Bird (1996), Bordo and James (2000), Connors (1979), Convoy (2000), Edwards (1989), Gylafson 
(1987), Killick et al. (1992), Pastor (1987) and Santaella (1996). Bird, Hussain and Joyce (2000) investigate the factors 
that cause countries to repeatedly enter into IMF programs, and Joyce (2001) investigates the factors that determine 
the duration of IMF programs. 3 
argue, however, that while officially the IMF doesn’t force countries to participate in programs and 
negotiate conditions, “In practice, it undermines the democratic process by imposing policies.”  
 A number of previous studies have attempted to measure the output costs of IMF-program 
participation. However, these studies have reached radically different conclusions—with results 
suggesting sizeable declines in output growth arising from participation in IMF programs (e.g. 
Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000) to quite strong positive output effects (e.g. Dicks-Mireaux et al., 
2000). These conflicting results arise from several sources, including differences in the types of IMF 
programs that are investigated; differences in the groups of countries that are investigated (e.g. poor 
developing versus emerging market economies); differences in the methodologies that are employed; 
and, perhaps most important, how other factors influencing output growth are taken into account.  
One area that has not been sufficiently addressed in previous work is the role of severe 
currency and/or balance of payments crises on output growth and how these events interact with 
subsequent participation in IMF programs. We argue that Heckman’s (1979) Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMR) approach does not adequately control for selection bias in this case, since “participation 
equations” in this literature (predicting whether a country participates in an IMF program) generally 
have low explanatory power. This is partly because 2/3 of IMF programs are not associated with 
severe balance of payments and/or currency crises (discussed in section 4). Our approach, by 
contrast, is to measure the output cost of participation in an IMF program, and investigate whether 
there are feedback effects that make implementation of programs especially problematic in the 
immediate aftermath or concurrent with an ongoing balance of payments/currency crisis. Our study 
focuses on three related questions: First, given that a country is already facing a severe currency 
crisis, does participation in an IMF-supported stabilization program tend to make real GDP growth 
weaker? Second, can one identify the channels (policy instruments) through which participation in 
IMF-supported programs affect real GDP? And, third, how much of the downturn in East Asia 
following the 1997-currency crisis may be attributed to participation in IMF programs?  
To address the first question we control for the effect of a currency crisis on real GDP, and 
consider whether there is an additional effect arising from IMF-program participation at this time. 
We want to be sure that the effect of a currency crisis on GDP is not inadvertently attributed to 
participation in an IMF program. The second question asks whether we can identify the policy 
channel or policy mechanism through which IMF-program participation affects real GDP growth. 
Beyond providing countries with access to substantial lines of credit, IMF programs are generally 
associated with conditions on the future conduct of fiscal, credit and other policies. Identifying the 4 
way IMF conditionality affects the formulation of policy in practice (ex post)—as opposed to the 
agreements themselves (ex ante)—is an important step in determining how participation in programs 
might affect GDP. If the critics of the IMF are right—conditionality leads to overly restrictive 
macroeconomic policies and poor output performance—then it should show up in the data. Finally, 
the answer to the third question should shed light on the macroeconomic performance of East Asian 
countries that faced currency crises in 1997, distinguishing those that entered into IMF programs 
(Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia) from the country that did not participate 
(Malaysia).  
To investigate these issues we focus on short-run IMF stabilization programs (Stand By 
Agreements and Extended Fund Facilities) that are explicitly focused on balance of payments 
adjustment, rather than programs directed primarily toward structural reform and poverty reduction. 
The broadest spectrum of developing and emerging-market countries possible is considered where 
the key limitation on the number of countries is the availability of macroeconomic data. The 
estimation methodology employed to investigate real growth effects of IMF programs is the General 
Evaluation Estimator (GEE). In this context, we control for the occurrence of recent 
currency/balance of payments crises and also test for interaction effects between the two events. This 
allows us to answer the question: Is the adverse output effect of a currency crisis made worse when 
the IMF steps in with a stabilization package? We test the basic model using a panel data set with 
country-specific fixed effects. Simple reaction functions are also estimated to characterize the 
influence of IMF programs on the formulation of macroeconomic policy. We take into account the 
effect of recent currency crises on policy as well as the effects of self-selection bias.    
Section 2 discusses the GEE methodology, and how we control for recent occurrences of 
currency crises. Section 3 discusses the data employed in the study and our selection of IMF 
programs to investigate. Section 4 provides a statistical background and summary statistics on the 
size, frequency over time, and regional distribution of IMF programs. We also consider the 
probability of a country adopting  an IMF program conditional upon having had a recent currency 
crisis. Section 5 presents the primary empirical results of the study. This section presents estimation 
results of the “reduced form” output equation with explanatory variables that include balance of 
payments/currency crises and IMF program participation. It also applies the model to explaining the 
recessions faced by East Asian countries following the 1997 currency crisis. Section 6 presents 
results from estimating policy reaction functions, and the effect of IMF programs on credit policy. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 5 
 
2.  GEE Methodology: Controlling for Currency and BOP Crises 
The basic General Evaluation Estimator (GEE) methodology employed in our study was first 
applied to the evaluation of IMF programs by Goldstein and Montiel (1986). It is based on the idea 
that one can derive a counterfactual—what would have happened to an IMF-participating country if 
it had not adopted a program—by investigating the policy responses of non-participating countries. 
The key element in this approach is that it must be possible to characterize macroeconomic policy 
choices by a simple and stable (over time and across countries) reaction function that holds for both 
participating and non-participating countries. We extend this standard model by introducing 
currency/balance of payments crisis as an additional factor influencing the evolution of output. We 
also introduce an interactive term that measures any additional adverse effect on output that is 
associated with IMF programs directly following a currency crisis.  
The growth of real GDP for the ith country at time t ( it y ) is explained by policies that would 
have been observed in the absence of an IMF-supported program ( it x ); exogenous external factors 
( it w ); the recent occurrence of a currency or balance-of-payments crisis (
cc
t i D ) 1 ( - ); the existence of an 
IMF-supported program (
imf
it D ); and unobservable random disturbances ( it e ).    
Growth 
it


















Policy reaction function: 
where x is a k-element vector of policy variables for country i at time t that would be observed in the 
absence of IMF support, w is an h-element vector of exogenous variables for country i at time  t, 
cc
t i D ) 1 ( - is a dummy variable equal to unity if the country has recently experienced a currency crisis 
(and zero otherwise), 
imf
it D  is a dummy variable equal to unity if a short-run IMF program is in 




it D D ) 1 ( - *  is an interaction term measuring additional effects on 
output growth arising from a currency crisis that is immediately followed by an IMF program, and 
it e  is a zero mean, fixed variance, serially uncorrelated, disturbance term.
3  0 b  is a  vector of country 
fixed effects (allowing average growth rates to vary across countries in the sample),  k b is a k-
                                                                 
3  See Dooley (1999) and Gupta et al. (2000) for discussions of the factors that cause output to fall following a currency 
crisis.  6 
element vector measuring the impact of policy changes on output,  h a  is a h-element vector 
measuring the impact of exogenous factors on output, 
cc b measures the effect of currency/balance-
of-payments crises on output growth, 
imf b measures the affect on output from participation in an 
IMF-supported stabilization program, and  
int b measures the effect of the interaction term. 
After postulating a rule for the k-element vector of policies that would have taken place in the 
absence of an IMF-supported program ( it x ), the model is estimated (with fixed effects) using panel 
data drawn from countries and periods in which IMF support was in place and those in which IMF 
support was absent. The aim is to get consistent estimates for 
imf b and
int b —the effects of IMF-
support on output.  
  Policies adopted in the absence of an IMF-supported program ( it x ) are directly 
observable only for non-program periods, and a key part of the GEE estimation approach is therefore 
to construct a counterfactual for policies during programs. This counterfactual is based upon a policy 
reaction function that links changes in the policy instrument to the deviation of the observed lagged 
value for output growth from its desired value (
d
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where  it h is a zero mean, fixed variance, serially uncorrelated error term assumed to be uncorrelated 
with  it e and  D is the difference operator. The parameter g  indicates the extent to which the policy 
instrument is adjusted in response to disequilbria in the target variable. Substituting (2) into (1) and 
subsuming desired output growth into the vector of fixed-effect constant terms for each country (
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Equation (3) is the basic GEE reduced form model as applied in earlier studies (Dicks-
Mireaux et al., 2000; Goldstein and Montiel, 1986; and others). The usefulness of the model, as 
discussed in detail in Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000), depends on (i) whether individual country 7 
behavior may be aggregated in a stable (across countries and time) uniform model; (ii) whether it 
may be assumed that the policy reaction function of a program country, had it not received IMF 








it D D b can fully capture all the channels 
(static and dynamic) through which participation in IMF-programs may affect output growth.  
Unlike previous studies, we control for the (lagged) occurrence of currency and balance of 
payments crises as a predetermined variable in the output growth equation. We also take into 
account the possibility that an interactive effect (operating between currency crises and the adoption 
of IMF programs) may have an additional impact on output growth. Leaving out these terms could 
leave the output growth equation misspecified and lead to biased estimates.  
 
3.  Selection of IMF Programs and Data Description 
Selection of IMF Programs 
The main IMF facilities designed to meet short-run balance of payments stabilization are 
Standby Arrangements (SBA) and the enhanced fund facility (EFF).
4  
In general, Fund members can access credit tranches from the General Resources Account 
(GRA) either by means of IMF program arrangements or by means of “outright purchases.” Outright 
purchases are limited, typically, for the first 25% of the member’s quota and do not involve any 
phasing or conditionality. Stand-by arrangements have been the main instrument through which 
members gain access to further credit tranches.
5 Stand By Arrangements (SBA) typically last for 12-
18 months (the legal maximum is 3 years) and first tranche drawings do not require strict 
conditionality. Any drawings beyond the first tranche require both phasing out and stricter 
conditionality and are limited to 100% of quota annually (300% cumulatively together with the 
Extended Fund Facility, EFF, as discussed below). Repurchase obligations last about 3 ¼ - 5 years 
from the date of purchase.  
The Extended Fund Facility, established in 1974, provides somewhat longer-term financing 
to countries in need of structural economic reforms. EFF arrangements typically last for 3 years; 
                                                                 
4 This discussion is based on International Monetary Fund (2000). Review of Fund Facilities—Preliminary 
Considerations (IMF, Washington D.C). 
 
5 As the Articles of Agreement state, they were defined as “a decision by the Fund by which a member is assured that it 
will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Account in accordance with the terms of the decision during 
a specified period and up to a specified amount” (Article XXX (b)). 8 
phasing and conditionality are similar to the SBAs with an emphasis on longer-term structural 
reforms. Quota limits are identical to the SBAs while repurchases last much longer (4½ - 10 years). 
Both facilities are subject to the same rate of interest for repayments.
6 The Supplemental Reserve 
Facility (SRF), introduced in 1997 in the Korean stabilization program, aims to supplement 
resources made available under SBAs and the EFF in order to provide financial assistance for 
exceptional balance of payments difficulties. Penalty interest rates (increasing over time) and short 
repayment periods (1–1½ years) insure that these are taken only in exceptional circumstances.
7 
We use the SBA and EFF programs (and, for Korea in 1997, the new SRF program) as our 
definition of “IMF-supported stabilization programs.” These are the only programs clearly linked to 
short-term balance of payments adjustment. (There are no cases of SBA and EFF programs being 
approved in the same year in this data sample). By contrast with these programs, some Fund 
facilities are designed with other objectives in mind. We do not include these programs since their 
primary objective is not short-run balance-of-payments stabilization and adjustment.  
For example, separate from the General Resources Account, the Fund established the 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 for “all low-income countries …that are in need of 
such resources and face protracted balance of payments problems”
 [italics mine]
8, and its successor, 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), in 1987. In 1999, the ESAF was replaced by 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). These are managed separately by the IMF and 
are financed from the sale of IMF-owned gold together with resources provided by members in the 
form of loans or grants to the Fund, as Trustee, for the purpose of helping low-income member 
countries. These resources are used to finance highly concessional, low-interest loans. Eligible 
countries can withdraw up to 185% of their quota conditional on their balance of payment needs and 
the strength of their adjustment program. The interest rate charged is 0.5%; and repayments are over 
a 10 year period.  
By contrast with our study, Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000) focus on the structural adjustment 
programs in their research (SAF and ESAF) and measure the effects of these IMF-supported 
programs on poor developing economies. Bordo and Schwartz (2000), on the other hand, consider 
both IMF stabilization and structural adjustment programs, and use a mixed sample of 20 emerging 
                                                                 
6 Starting in 1989, the rate of charge was linked directly to the SDR interest rate, and adjusted weekly. 
 
7 In our sample, the only such case is the agreement with Korea in 1997. 
 
8 As determined by the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank’s concessional window (the 
current cutoff point for IDA eligibility is a 1999 per capita GDP level of $885). 9 
market and developed countries (including Australia and New Zealand). Similarly, Przeworski and 
Vreeland (2000) do not differentiate between programs, including both stabilization and structural 
adjustment IMF programs. But, similar to our work (and unlike Bordo and Schwartz (2000) or 
Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000)), they consider a broad set of developing countries. Our basic results, 
however, are robust to broadening the definition of IMF programs to include the SAF and ESAF.  
 
Defining Currency and Balance of Payments Crises  
Our indicator of currency and balance of payments crises is constructed from “large” changes 
in an index of currency pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real exchange rate 
changes and monthly (percent) reserve losses.
9 Following convention (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999) the weights are inversely related to the variance of changes of each component over the 
sample for each country. Our measure, taken from Glick and Hutchison (2000 and 2001), presumes 
that any nominal currency changes associated with exchange rate pressure should affect the 
purchasing power of the domestic currency, i.e. result in a change in the real exchange rate (at least 
in the short run). This condition excludes some large depreciations that occur during high inflation 
episodes, but it avoids screening out sizeable depreciation events in more moderate inflation periods 
for countries that have occasionally experienced periods of hyperinflation and extreme devaluation.
10 
An episode of severe exchange rate pressure is defined as a value in the index—a threshold point—
that exceeds the mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation, provided that it also 
exceeds 5 percent.
11 The first condition insures that any large (real) depreciation is counted as a 
currency crisis, while the second condition attempts to screen out changes that are insufficiently 
large in an economic sense relative to the country-specific monthly change of the exchange rate. 
                                                                 
9 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving sharp rises in interest rates. 
Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period in many of the developing 
countries in our dataset. 
 
10 This approach differs from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal with episodes of 
hyperinflation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation observations for each country according to 
whether or not inflation in the previous 6 months was greater than 150 percent, and they calculate for each sub-sample 
separate standard deviation and mean estimates with which to define exchange rate crisis episodes. 
 
11Other studies defining the threshold of large changes in terms of country-specific moments include Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); and Esquivel amd Larrain (1998). Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and 
Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the precise cut-off chosen in selecting crisis episodes. 
 10 
For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of currency crises, as 
defined above (1 = crisis, 0 = no crisis). A currency crisis is deemed to have occurred for a given 
year if the currency pressure index for any month of that year satisfies our criteria (i.e. two standard 
deviations above the mean as well as greater than five percent in magnitude). To reduce the chances 
of capturing the continuation of the same currency crisis episode, we impose windows on our data. 
In particular, after identifying each “large” indication of currency pressure, we treat any similar 
threshold point reached in the following 24-month window as a part of the same currency episode 
and skip the years of that change before continuing the identification of new crises. With this 
methodology, we identify 160 currency crises over the 1975-97 period. 
 
Other Variables in the Output Growth Equation and Policy Function 
Estimation of the reduced from equation (3) for the output growth equation necessitates that 
the external exogenous variables influencing output growth (vector  it w ) and the (lagged) policy 
instruments (vector  ) 1 ( - t i x ) are identified. The external exogenous factors included are (trade-
weighted) lagged external growth rates of major trading partners and the lagged rate of real 
exchange rate overvaluation.
12 The (lagged) policy factors considered are the change in the budget 
surplus to GDP ratio, inflation, and credit growth.  
In the policy reaction function estimates of equation (2), we also consider regional dummy 
variables and a measure of policy “autocracy.”
13 In controlling for sample selection bias, a probit 
equation explaining the likelihood of IMF-program participation is estimated. Other variables 
employed in this estimation, not noted above, are the (lagged) foreign exchange reserves to imports 
ratio, the change in the current account to GDP ratio, and real per capita GDP growth. These 
macroeconomic data series are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS CD-ROM.   
The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that GDP are available for a 
minimum of 10 consecutive years over the period 1975-97. This requirement results in a sample of 
                                                                 
12 Real exchange rate overvaluation is defined as deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade weighted exchange rate. 
The real trade-weighted exchange rate is the trade-weighted sum of the bilateral real exchange rates (defined in terms 
of CPI indices) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the Japanese yen. The trade-weights are based on the 
average bilateral trade with the United States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 1990. 
 
13 Autocracy is an index ranging from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the most “closed” political system. This source of this 
variable is the “polity” database. 
 11 
67 developing countries.
14 We use annual observations in our analysis. While we employ monthly 
data for our (real) exchange rate pressure index to identify currency crises and date each by the year 
in which it occurs, using annual data enables inclusion of a relatively large number of countries. The 
appendix table provides details on the countries included in the sample, the currency crisis dates, and 
the periods when countries participated in IMF programs.  
 
4.  Summary Statistics: IMF Programs, Currency Crises and the Economy 
IMF Programs: Size, Growth and Regional Distribution 
The frequencies of the IMF programs are shown in Table 1 (for all countries) over the 1970-
99 period. (Descriptive statistics on IMF programs reported in Tables 1-2 cover the 1970-99 period, 
while the other tables involving statistical analysis cover the 1975-97 period.) The total number of 
programs, the average size in terms of SDRs (in parentheses), and the size of the average program as 
a percent of the recipient country GDP (in brackets) is given in the table. The table is divided into 
short-term stabilization (focus of our study) and longer-term structural adjustment programs, and 
also separated into five-year intervals.   
Over the 30-year period, 845 IMF programs were approved, of which 678 were short-run 
stabilization programs—Standby Agreements (SBA) or the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Only 167 
were longer-term structural adjustment programs—Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) or the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  
The number of programs reached a peak in the early 1980s (with the Mexican debt crisis and 
debt problems in other Latin American countries), both in terms of number of programs (169) and 
size relative to the economies involved (average program size over 4 percent of GDP). The number 
of IMF programs is not growing, nor is the size relative to the economies involved (about 2 percent 
of GDP in 1995-99). The size of the average program in terms of SDRs jumped in the late 1990s, 
however, due to the large economic size of the countries going to the IMF for assistance (e.g. Brazil, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Russian Federation, and South Korea).
15 
The regional breakdown of program approvals is given in Table 2. The short-term 
stabilization programs (SBA and EFF) are primarily directed to Latin America and Africa, with 
                                                                 
14 The developing country sample excludes major oil-exporting countries.  
15 This includes the disbursement to Korea under the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF).  12 
about 30 and 35 percent respectively of program approvals. Africa dominates the long-term 
structural programs (SAF/ESAF and PRGF) with 70 percent of the programs over the period.  
 
Currency Crises and IMF Program Participation 
An important part of our study is to investigate the link between currency crises, real output 
developments and IMF stabilization programs. Table 3 shows the relative frequencies of currency 
crises and IMF stabilization program participation for the 67 countries in our sample over the 1975-
1997 period. Panel A shows the contemporaneous frequencies (and associated chi-squared 
independence tests), i.e. contemporaneous currency crises and contemporaneous IMF program 
participation. Statistical independence of these observations is rejected at the 99 percent level of 
confidence, but only 18 percent of IMF program participation observations are associated with 
currency crises. However, a substantially higher percentage (28 percent) of the currency crisis 
observations coincide with IMF program observations.    
Panel B shows the link between IMF programs and contemporaneous and lagged currency 
crises. This shows a stronger link than the contemporaneous relationship. Statistical independence is 
again rejected (at greater than 1 percent significance). 33 percent of contemporaneous IMF program 
participation observations are associated with either a contemporaneous or previous (one-year lag) 
currency crisis. Similarly, 28 percent of contemporaneous or lagged currency crises are associated 
with a contemporaneous IMF program. Hence, almost a third of currency crisis observations are 
linked to an IMF program within the current year or next year. Of course, this implies that about 2/3 
of the currency crisis observations are not linked with IMF program participation.   
 
Macro Developments: Participation/Non-participation and Before/After Statistics 
Tables 4–6 present summary statistics on the timing of IMF programs (SBA and EFF) 
participation and key macroeconomic developments. Table 4 shows sample mean values for 
macroeconomic developments during program years and non-program years. The first two columns 
report the statistics for all countries (both for those countries that at some point participated in IMF 
programs and for those that did not), focusing on non-program observations and IMF-program 
observations. Real GDP growth was about 4% [1082 observations] during the non-program years 
and 2.9% during the program years [585 observations]. This difference is significantly different at 
the 99 percent level of confidence (t-statistic equal to 4.83). Inflation and budget deficits are 13 
significantly higher during the program years, but no substantive difference between program and 
non-program years is detected in the growth rate of credit or the current account balance.  
There may be systematic differences in the types of countries that approach the IMF for 
assistance, however. Focusing only on countries participating in IMF programs (second, third and 
fourth columns) avoids this selection bias. For countries involved in IMF programs (at some point 
during the sample), average GDP growth was 3.6% during non-program years and 2.9% during 
program years. This difference is statistically significant. Inflation was also significantly lower 
during the non-program years. No difference is discernible in credit growth or the budget and current 
account balances.  
If one simply compares IMF-program countries (both during program and non-program 
years) with those not having a program during the sample period, the differences are substantial—
but not surprising. Countries that have never participated in an IMF program during our sample 
period—presumably not having had a need to participate—exhibit much stronger economic 
fundamentals: much higher GDP growth rates (6.8% versus 3.4%), lower inflation, lower credit 
growth, and balanced positions in the current account and budget. 
Table 5 focuses on the before/after time series of countries participating in IMF programs. 
Four-year windows are imposed. The table shows that output growth does not decline substantially 
when a country enters an IMF program, but does increase significantly during the two-year period 
following the program. Credit growth, by contrast, falls significantly during the IMF program and 
stays at the lower rate of growth following the program. No statistically significant shifts are noted 
in the time pattern of inflation, the current account balance or the budget surplus.  
Table 6 undertakes the same decomposition as Table 5 but instead imposes only a two-year 
window, together with a one-year interval before and after IMF program participation. Real GDP 
growth is not much different one year before and during an IMF program, but rebounds substantially 
the year following a program. Inflation drops before/during and after programs, but the variation in 
the sample is so great that the differences are not statistically significant. Credit growth drops 
sharply following an IMF program and stays lower one year following a program. The budget 
balance improves during an IMF program and stays at a lower level following the program. 
Tables 5 and 6 clearly demonstrate that economies typically experience slow growth prior to 
entering into an IMF program, and sluggish growth continues until the program is concluded. It does 
not appear that participation in the IMF program directly contributed to slower growth. Inflation and 
credit growth both declined during the IMF-program and stayed lower than the pre-program period. 14 
In short, these summary statistics paint a classic recession-rebound pattern but it is not clear if IMF 
program participation played a role.  
 
5.  Real Output Effects of IMF Programs 
General Evaluation Estimator (GEE) Estimates 
The reduced form GEE estimates (equation 3) are reported in Table 7. White’s consistent 
standard errors are reported. The first column reports the model without controlling for country fixed 
effects or currency crises. The lagged control variables are the change in the budget surplus ratio, 
inflation, credit growth, external (world) output growth, and real exchange rate overvaluation. A 
lagged dependent variable, as suggested in the theoretical formulation of the model, is also included. 
The focus is the coefficient on the IMF-program dummy. The coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant (99 percent level of confidence) and indicates that real GDP growth is lowered by about 1 
percent during each year of IMF-program participation. 
The estimated coefficients on lagged external growth (positive) and lagged real exchange rate 
overvaluation (negative) have the predicted signs and are statistically significant. In terms of the 
policy variables, the estimated coefficient on the lagged change in the budget surplus is positive and 
the estimated coefficient on lagged credit growth is negative. Both are statistically significant. 
Interpreting these coefficients in terms of reaction functions, the rise in the lagged budget surplus 
(rise in credit growth) could lead to a more expansionary (restrictive) contemporaneous fiscal policy 
(credit policy) and hence rise (fall) in output growth. Other interpretations are possible. For example, 
countries with more sustainable fiscal policies and lower credit growth may have systemically higher 
real output growth rates. Inclusion of fiscal and credit variables may be picking up important cross-
country differences in economic performance.   
Column 2 reports results for the model with country fixed effects (dummy variables for each 
country to capture the significant differences in growth rates over the full sample period) and the 
currency crisis variable. These variables are highly statistically significant, increasing the overall 
explanatory power of the model (R-squared) from 12 percent to 21 percent. A currency crisis in year 
t-1 is associated with a decline in output growth in year t of about 1.5 percentage points. The 
coefficient estimate on the IMF-participation variable decreases substantially when the currency 
crisis variable is taken into account, indicating that output growth is about 0.74 percentage points 15 
less annually for each year of IMF-program participation. This coefficient estimate, however, is only 
significant at the 90 percent level of confidence.  
Column 3 reports the results of the model when both contemporaneous and lagged currency 
crisis variables are included in the regression. Both of the currency crisis variables are negative and 
statistically significant. The coefficient estimate on the IMF-program participation is similar (0.78) 
to the result reported in column 2.  
Column 4 reports the results where the model includes an interactive term measuring the 
occurrence of an IMF-program that takes place around the time of a recent occurrence of a currency 
crisis (i.e. contemporaneous or in the previous year). The model estimates again suggest that a 
currency crisis leads to an output loss, but the coefficient estimate (-0.66) on the IMF program 
dummy variable is not statistically significant. Is the output loss associated with a currency crisis 
magnified if an IMF program is approved in the same year or immediately following a severe 
balance of payments or currency crisis? The interaction term in column 4 is not statistically 
significant, indicating that the output loss associated with a crisis does not appear to be affected by a 
country’s participation in an IMF program.  
Column 5 reports results from estimating a more dynamic specification of the model. The 
objective is to investigate whether the adverse effects from participating in an IMF program 
dissipate, or perhaps intensify, over time. This is accomplished by including three lags of the IMF-
participation variable. It appears that the adverse output effects are felt during the years of IMF 
program participation (generally 1-3 years), but no significant additional effects are observed in 
subsequent years. That is, neither the sum of the coefficients on the three lagged values of program 
participation nor the joint test is statistically different from zero (see footnote b to table 7).   
In sum, the results are robust and indicate that participating in an IMF-program, regardless of 
whether a currency or balance of payments crisis has recently occurred, “costs” about 0.6-0.8 
percentage points of real GDP growth annually. Our estimates are about half the size of the negative 
impact reported by Przeworski and Vreeland (2000)
16 or Bordo and Schwartz (2000)
17, and similar 
                                                                 
16 Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) estimate a long run growth model (using capital and labor growth as independent 
variables), dividing the sample into (IMF) program observations and non-program observations. They also include the 
IMR in the regression. Their conclusions regarding the growth effects of IMF-program participation are based on the 
difference between the estimated constant terms in the two regressions.  
 16 
in magnitude to Conway (1994). Unlike Conway (1994), however, we do not find that the reduction 
in growth is followed by higher future output growth
18.   
It is noteworthy that we also tested for sample selection bias in the estimation procedure, and 
the results were unaffected. The estimates on the IMF and currency crisis variables did not change 
and the coefficient on IMR was not statistically significant. (The probit equation estimated to 
measure self-selection bias is presented in Appendix Table 3.) Of course, insignificance of the IMR 
variable may either be because selection bias is not an important issue or because the participation 
equation is misspecified. These results are not reported for brevity but are available from the author 
upon request. This finding is similar to Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000).  (We do find IMR significant in 
the policy reaction functions, however.)  
 
Extensions: IMF Program Dating and Downturns Prior to IMF Program Approvals 
Table 8 presents several extensions of the basic output growth model. The first two columns 
use the conventional dating scheme employed in Table 7, i.e. dating the IMF program in the calendar 
year in which it was approved. The first column adds a one-year leading indicator of IMF program 
participation (“lead IMF program participation dummy, t+1”) and the second column adds a one-
year leading indicator of IMF program approval (only the year of approval; subsequent program 
years are coded as zero). The descriptive evidence presented in Table 6 suggests that a downturn in 
output tends to lead (by one year) participation in an IMF program. A lagged dependent variable 
included in the basic output growth equation helps to account for this dynamic. If “cycles” are 
irregular, however, inclusion of the IMF leading variable might be able to better capture downward 
shifts in output growth occurring with some regularity prior to IMF program participation. The 
leading IMF dummy variable is not significant in either column 1 or 2, however, and the 
contemporaneous effects are quite similar to those reported in Table 7.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
17 Bordo and Schwartz (2000) report a contemporaneous effect of IMF programs of –1.61 (t=-0.97) and a one-year 
lagged effect of 2.24 (t=2.67). The contemporaneous effect is insignificantly different from zero and the one-year 
lagged effect is significant at the 99 percent level of confidence. On balance, their results indicate that IMF program 
participation has a net positive effect on growth. Surprisingly, they conclude that: “The main detriment [of IMF 
program participation] is a temporary reduction in real growth.” (p. 57) and “…the impression given by the annual 
data—that turning to the IMF may be harmful to a country’s real economic performance…”  (p. 60). Our results are 
not directly comparable, however, since they have a limited sample of emerging market and developed countries (20 
total), and include short-run stabilization programs, structural adjustment, and poverty reduction programs in their 
study. 
 
18 Similar to our study, Conway (1994) uses only SBA and EFF programs in his study. 17 
 The second two columns use an alternative-dating scheme for the implementation of IMF 
programs that has been used by Dicks Mireaux et al. (2000) and others. This dating scheme dates the 
IMF program to be in effect in year t if it was approved in the first half of year t or in the second half 
of year t-1. Again the leading IMF program dummy variable is not statistically significant. However, 
the estimated contemporaneous effects of IMF programs on output growth using the alternative-
dating scheme do change somewhat. In particular, the estimated negative effect of an IMF program 
in column 3 (IMF program participation) rises to –1.22 and is significant at the 95 percent level of 
confidence. By contrast, the estimated output effect in the year of an IMF program approval is 
insignificant. These results indicate that changes in the dating scheme of IMF program 
implementation and program definition (whether defined as all years of participation or only the first 
year of approval) affect the results to some extent but do not change the basic findings.  
We also estimated the basic model over the 1990-97 period, as the evolving nature of IMF 
programs and conditionality may have changed their effect on output.  In particular, the number of 
conditions attached to IMF programs have increased in the 1990s. The coefficient on the IMF 
dummy drops to only –0.36 in this regression and is not significant at conventional levels.  
 
The East Asian Financial Crisis and Output Contraction 
Figure 1 presents the predicted values for output growth for the five East Asian countries that 
experienced a severe currency and balance of payments crisis in 1997. These predictions are for 
1998 and based on 1997 values of the explanatory variables and the coefficient estimates—including 
country-specific fixed effects—are based on the model presented in column 3 of Table 7 (estimates 
are based on 1975-97 data). The explanatory factors leading to the 1998 predicted value are 
decomposed into: (a) domestic factors (change in budget surplus, inflation, and credit growth), (b) 
external factors (external growth and real exchange rate overvaluation), (c) other factors (previous 
year’s output growth and country-specific fixed effect), (d) the currency crisis effect, and (e) the 
IMF-participation effect.  
Predicted output growth for all 5 countries is positive in 1998, and the forecast error 
(unexpected declines in output) is therefore very large. The negative effect exerted by the currency 
crisis and subsequent participation in an IMF program is entirely dominated by positive “other 
factors”—mainly a history of very strong growth in the region and the consequently large country-
specific fixed effect growth factor—and a modestly supportive external growth environment. The 18 
effect of the currency crisis was expected to slow output growth by between 1–2 percentage points 
and IMF-program participation (for Indonesia, Thailand, Korea and the Philippines) lowers 
predicted growth by about 0.8 percentage points.  
The largest unexpected fall in real GDP was Indonesia (17.6 percentage points) and the least 
in the Philippines (3 percentage points). The average of the four negative forecast error for the four 
countries participating in IMF programs was 12.3 percentage points, not much different than the 
13.5 unexpected fall in Malaysia’s GDP. Not participating in the IMF program did not appear to help 
Malaysia avoid a huge fall in output, and this decline was similar to others in the region.
19 The 0.8 
predicted negative effect of participating in an IMF program pales by comparison with the actual 
declines in output observed.  
There appears to have been a common shock or common vulnerability in these countries—
not related to the IMF and unobserved in this model—causing the unexpectedly large collapse in 
output.
20 All of these countries serious banking problems that were associated with currency crises, a 
characteristic likely to cause substantially greater output effects, working through the disruption of 
credit and other channels (Glick and Hutchison, 2001). Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore avoided 
the worst of the currency and banking problems because they did not have significant external 
(foreign-currency denominated) short term debt positions.  Other factors, such as an abrupt loss of 
confidence after two decades of rapid growth and unrealistically high expectations for the region, 
may also have played a role.  
 
6.  Is Policy Changed by IMF Program Participation? 
An important assumption underlying the GEE strategy is that it is possible to characterize 
policy actions in the form of stable and systematic reaction functions (equation 2). This may prove 
extremely difficult since we are attempting to identify common responses from a broad spectrum of 
                                                                 
19 Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) argue that, following the crisis, the imposition of capital controls in Malaysia, as opposed to 
adoption of an IMF program, led to a faster recovery and lower unemployment compared to Thailand and South 
Korea.  They compare the aftermath of the imposition of controls in 1998 with the adoption of IMF programs in 1997 
by Korea and Thailand (using the time-shifted difference-in-difference specification). However, this approach does not 
take into account a counterfactual that the Malaysian currency crisis probably would not have extended to September 
1998 if it had adopted an IMF program in 1997. 
 
20 It is possible that the “common shock” was indeed especially severe austerity programs associated with the IMF 
programs, and perhaps mimicked by Malaysia to gain international acceptance of its policies. However, the evidence 
reported by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) and others, and the imposition of capital controls by Malaysia, does not support 
this view.  
 19 
developing and emerging-market countries over a thirty-year period. The work of Dicks-Mireaux et 
al. (2000) highlight the problems in identifying a consistent policy reaction function even among 
low-income developing economies. For example, they do not find any significant determinants of 
the fiscal balance or net domestic credit. They conclude “…these estimates provide a weak basis for 
deriving estimates of the unobservable counterfactuals.” (p. 508). 
Table 9 presents our estimates of policy reaction functions for domestic credit growth—a 
primary policy instrument for many developing economies. Domestic credit growth is also a key 
indicator of monetary policy used by the IMF in conditionality and surveillance. Equations for 
narrow money growth, broad money growth, and government budget policy-reaction functions were 
also estimated but the results are much weaker and not reported for brevity.  
Column 1 reports the results of the basic policy reaction-function model for all observations 
in the sample (program and non-program years), while columns 2 and 3 report the estimates over the 
program and non-program observations, respectively. Consistent with the theoretical formulation of 
the model, the macroeconomic determinants consist of lagged values of the current account surplus 
(relative to GDP), inflation, real GDP growth, and whether or not the country experienced a currency 
crisis. Also included are regional dummy variables and a dummy variable for the form of 
government (“autocracy”). Further, in the equations for non-program years and program years we 
have included the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) to control for sample selection bias. (The probit model 
estimated with IMF program approvals as the dependent variable is reported in Appendix Table 3. 
The IMR is calculated from the predicted values of this model.)  
The only significant macroeconomic predictors of credit growth, shown in columns (1)-(3), 
are lagged inflation and the occurrence of a currency crisis in the previous year. The coefficient 
estimates of lagged inflation range between 0.6-0.7, indicating that a one-percentage point rise in 
inflation is associated with a rise (fall) in nominal credit growth (real credit growth) of about 0.7 
(0.3) percentage points. Interpreting this equation as a reaction function suggests that, in response to 
a rise in inflation, the authorities respond by reducing real credit growth. The coefficient on the 
(lagged) currency crisis variable is positive and significant in columns 1 and 3, indicating that 
countries generally respond to currency crises by expanding credit growth.  
The constant term is much lower during IMF programs (6.9) relative to the non-program 
observations (28.8), suggesting more restrictive policy on average during the IMF-program years. 
The IMR is significant in the IMF-program-years regression (column 3), indicating that sample 20 
selection bias is an issue—countries don’t randomly enter into IMF programs and their decision to 
participate is systematically linked to domestic credit growth. 
The regressions reported in columns 4 and 5 cover all years and control for IMF-program 
participation by including a dummy variable in the regression. Country specific dummy variables are 
included in these regressions—a fixed-effects model formulation—in order to control for the wide 
variation in average credit growth across countries. These results indicate the importance of 
controlling for country fixed effects in attempting to explain credit growth over such a wide diversity 
of countries. The impact of inflation is substantially reduced (to 0.4), indicating that inflation 
reduces real credit growth. The dummy variable on autocracy is also significant in one formulation 
of the model as are the regional dummy variables.   
We find that, in column 4, IMF programs reduce domestic credit growth by about 4 
percentage points during the period they are in effect. Inclusion of the interactive term, in column 5, 
indicates that currency crises tend to induce greater credit expansion (by 11 percentage points) and 
the joint coincidence of a recent currency crisis and current IMF program is associated with a 
contraction of credit by about 15 percent annually. The joint effect of a currency crisis (lagged) 
followed by an IMF program is estimated to reduce credit growth by about 5.6 percentage points 
(11.2–1.3–15.6). 
These results suggest that IMF program participation is associated with restrictive credit 
growth. Investigations of budget policy and money growth, however, did not indicate any link 
between IMF program participation and policy. Even the credit reaction function is fairly weak, 
however, likely reflecting shifts in policy over time and the fact that the types of countries going to 
the IMF for assistance have very different characteristics than countries not going to the IMF.    
 
The East Asian Financial Crisis and Credit Growth 
The empirical credit growth equation (column 4 of Table 9) is employed to predict credit 
growth for the five East Asian countries that experienced currency crises in 1997. Predicted credit 
growth was divided into component parts and the “unexpected” (forecast error) calculated. In every 
case, credit growth in 1998 is predicted to be quite strong, ranging from 15.5 (Philippines) to 24.4 
(Indonesia). Participation in IMF programs lowered predicted credit growth by about 4 percentage 21 
points, and the predicted response to the currency crises increased predicted credit growth by about 4 
percentage points.
21  
A sharp and unanticipated contraction (negative forecast error) was experienced in every 
country except for Indonesia following the East Asian currency crisis. The countries that participated 
in IMF programs experienced smaller unexpected declines (Korea: -8.4 percent; Philippines: -17.5 
percent; Thailand: -18.2 percent) than did Malaysia (-23.2), and Indonesia experienced a sharp 
unpredicted jump in credit. The observed decline, as opposed to the negative forecast error, in credit 
growth was also largest in Malaysia at -2.7 percent. Indonesia, by contrast, experienced a 18.6 
percent unpredicted rise in credit and an observed rise of 43 percent. Similar to the output growth 
prediction results, Malaysia was hurt at least as much by the Asian currency crisis as the  IMF-
program countries.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
The estimated cost of an IMF stabilization program, in terms of foregone output growth, is 
about 0.6-0.8 percentage points during each year of program participation. Currency crises also 
reduce output growth over a two-year period by about 2 percentage points. Participation in an IMF-
supported program following a balance of payments or currency crisis, however, does not appear to 
mitigate or exacerbate the output loss. This is despite the fact that countries participating in IMF-
programs seem to follow much tighter credit policy when facing a severe balance of payments crisis. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that the decline in GDP growth generally precedes the approval of 
an IMF program and may not be attributable to program participation per se. These results are robust 
to estimation technique, model specification, types of IMF programs included, and corrections for 
sample selection bias.   
The huge declines in output and credit growth in the wake of the 1997 Asian currency crisis 
were much larger than predicted by historical patterns linking GDP developments to currency crises, 
IMF program participation, external conditions and policy developments. Indeed, the models 
predicted fairly robust output growth and credit growth in 1998 despite the currency crises and, in 
most cases, participation in IMF-supported programs. The unexpected falls in output and credit were 
also very large in Malaysia, even though it chose not to participate in an IMF stabilization program 
at the time. Whether or not a country decided to participate in an IMF-supported program at the time 
of the Asian currency crisis seems to have had little affect on the ultimate output cost.  
                                                                 
21 These results are not reported for brevity but are available from the author upon request. 22 
The effect of IMF-supported stabilization programs on output growth—judging by the 
experiences of 67 countries with over 450 programs—does not appear large in comparison with the 
average growth rates of developing and emerging-market economies over the 1975–97 period. 
Nonetheless, whether or not the cost of participating in an IMF-supported stabilization program 
exceeds the benefit measured in terms of balance of payments adjustment and continued access to 
credit markets is an open question to be answered by policymakers in the countries involved.   23 
Appendix:  Participation in IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs 
Appendix Table 3 presents a probit equation attempting to explain participation in short-term 
IMF programs by a variety of economic determinants. Our selection of economic determinants is 
guided by previous literature in this area, especially Knight and Santaella (1997) who test a number 
of supply side (e.g. willingness of the IMF to approve programs) and demand side (e.g. demand of a 
particular country for IMF credits) determinants. This literature demonstrates that entering into an 
IMF agreement is not random, but guided by “…a clear set of observable economic factors that are 
strongly correlated with the event of approval of a financial arrangement.” (p. 431).  They find that a 
low level of international reserves, low per capita GDP, high ratio of external debt service (to export 
earnings), movements in the real exchange rate, weak GDP growth and a low rate of domestic 
investment induce countries to seek an IMF-supported program. Policy measures to enhance fiscal 
revenues, reduce government expenditures, to tighten domestic credit, and to adjust the exchange 
rate are significant factors likely to win IMF approval of programs.  
We report similar results in Appendix Table 3. We find that an improvement in the budget 
surplus helps win IMF approval of programs, while lower foreign exchange reserves (relative to 
imports) and a currency crisis induce countries to seek an IMF program. Countries in Africa and 
Asia are less likely to have short-term IMF programs approved. There is no discernible shift in the 
probability of having an IMF program approved in the 1980s and 1990s compared to earlier periods 
and, surprisingly, we find no connection between program approval and inflation, real exchange 
rates, real per capita GDP growth or the level of real GDP per capita. Other lagged values were 
investigated but did not add explanatory power to the model. 
There are 862 observations in sample, and the model (at the 25% predicted probability cut-
off point) predicts 71 percent of the observations correctly. But while 80 percent of the “no program 
participation” observations are correctly predicted, only 34 percent of the "program approval” 
observations are correctly predicted. At the 10 percent probability cut-off point, however, 96 percent 
of the “program participation” observations are correctly predicted but only 32 percent of the “no 
participation” observations. 24 
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Table 1 
IMF Programs in Developing Countries – Approvals by Time (1970-1999) 
 
Number of programs approved  
(average size of program in million SDRs)  




(SBA, ESBA, EFF) 
Long-Term 
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Totals  678  167  845 
 
a The size relative to GDP statistic is limited by data availability. 28 
Table 2 
IMF programs – Approvals by Region (1970-1999) 
 
Number of programs approved  
(Percent of IMF program by region) 
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% of short-term IMF programs associated with a 
contemporaneous currency crisis 
18 
% of currency crisis associated with a 
contemporaneous short-term IMF program 
28 
Chi independence test for contemporaneous IMF 
and currency crisis series 
0.0004 
Panel B 
% of short-term IMF programs associated with a 
contemporaneous or lagged (t-1) currency crisis 
33 
% of contemporaneous or lagged (t-1) currency 
crisis associated with a short-term IMF program 
28 
Chi independence test for contemporaneous IMF 




Summary Statistics – Short Term IMF programs 
 
means 
(t-statistic for difference in means with the column to the left) 
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a the countries that have never participated in a short-term IMF program (either SBA or EFF), and that are included in our 
data-set, are: Botswana, Hong-Kong, Malta, Malaysia, Paraguay, Singapore and Swaziland. 31 
 Table 5 
Before/After Summary Statistics - IMF short term programs – 4 year window 
 
means 
(t-statistic for difference in means with the column to the left) 
[t-statistic for difference in means with the first column] 
(Number of observations) 
 
Variables   Average of 2 years 
before IMF program 
During IMF 
program years 
Average of 2 years 
after IMF program 







































































 Table 6 
Before/After Summary Statistics - IMF short term programs – 2 year window 
 
Mean values 
(t-statistic for difference in means with the column to the left) 
[t-statistic for difference in means with the first column] 
(Number of observations) 
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 Table 7 
Output Growth Equation Estimates 
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Dynamics for IMF participation dummy 
 for Short-Term programs  b  (t-1, t-2, t-3) 
       
-0.457 
(0.10) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.12  0.22  0.23  0.22  0.22 
Number of observations  1128  966  958  958  958 
Durbin-Watson Statistic  1.61  2.00  1.99  1.98  1.98 
a all regressions, except the first, include country dummies.  
b  sum of the coefficients of the IMF dummy lagged for t-1, 
t-2 and t-3 (t-statistic on sum of lags reported). F-statistic (joint significance of three lagged values) is 0.86.  34 
                     Table 8 
Output Growth Equation – Extensions    
Dependent Variable: real GDP growth rate
 
Coefficients 
(t statistics)  Variables
 a 



























































































































Adjusted R-squared  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.22 
Number of observations  958  958  958  958 
Durbin-Watson Statistic  1.99  2.00  1.99  2.00 
a all regressions include country dummies. 35 
Table 9 
Policy Reaction Function Estimates 
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Inverse Mills Ratio, IMR  





   



























Adjusted R-squared  0.38  0.47  0.41  0.44  0.44 
Number of observations  987  322  505  987  987 
Durbin-Watson Statistic  1.73  1.27  1.92  1.81  1.83 
a columns 4-5 regressions also include country dummies. 36 
Figure 1 – Real GDP Growth in East Asia 


























































































predicted output growth unexpected output growth
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Appendix – Table 1 
Countries Included in Data-set 
Emerging Markets 
(25 countries) 
Other Developing Countries 
(42 countries) 
Argentina  Bangladesh  Mali 
Brazil  Belize  Morocco 
Chile  Bolivia  Mozambique 
Colombia  Botswana  Myanmar 
Costa Rica  Burundi  Nepal 
Cyprus  Cameroon  Nicaragua 
Dominican Republic  Ecuador  Nigeria 
Hong Kong  Egypt  Pakistan 
Indonesia  El Salvador  Paraguay 
Jordan  Equatorial Guinea  Peru 
Korea  Ethiopia  Sierra Leone 
Malaysia  Fiji  Sri Lanka 
Malta  Ghana  Swaziland 
Mauritius  Grenada  Syrian Arab Rep. 
Mexico  Guatemala  Uganda 
Panama  Guinea-Bissau  Zambia 
Philippines  Guyana  Zimbabwe 
Singapore  Haiti   
South Africa  Honduras   
Thailand  India   
Trinidad and Tobago  Jamaica   
Tunisia  Kenya   
Turkey  Lao P.D. Rep.   
Uruguay  Madagascar   
Venezuela  Malawi   
 39 
Appendix – Table 2 
Occurrences of Currency Crises and IMF program participation 
  Currency Crises1  IMF programs2 
Argentina  1975, 1982, 1989  1972f, 1973f, 1975f, 1976a, 1976f, 1977a, 1983a, 1984a, 1987a, 1989a, 1991a, 
1992b, 1996a 
Bolivia  1981, 1983, 1988, 1991  1973a, 1980a, 1986a, 1986c, 1988c, 1994c 
Brazil  1982, 1987, 1990, 1995  1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1983b, 1988a, 1992a 
Chile  1985  1970a, 1972f, 1973f, 1974a, 1975a, 1985b, 1989a  
Columbia  1985  1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a  
Costa Rica  1981  1976a, 1980a, 1981b, 1982a, 1985a, 1987a, 1989a, 1991a, 1993a, 1995a 
Dominican Republic  1985, 1987, 1990  1983b, 1985a, 1991a, 1993a 
Ecuador  1982, 1985, 1988  1970a, 1972a, 1983a, 1985a, 1986a, 1988a, 1989a, 1991a, 1994a 
El Salvador  1986, 1990  1970a, 1972a, 1980a, 1982a, 1990a, 1992a, 1993a, 1995a, 1997a 
Guatemala  1986, 1989  1970a, 1972a, 1981a, 1983a, 1988a, 1992a 
Haiti  1977, 1991  1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1975a, 1976a, 1977a, 1978b, 1982a, 1983a, 
1986c, 1989a, 1995a, 1996d 
Honduras  1990  1971a, 1972a, 1979b, 1982a, 1990a, 1992c 
Mexico  1976, 1982, 1985, 1994  1977b, 1983b, 1986a, 1989b, 1995a 
Nicaragua  1993  1970a, 1972a, 1979a, 1991a, 1994c  
Panama    1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1975a, 1977a, 1978a, 1979a, 1980a, 1982a, 
1983a, 1985a, 1992a, 1995a, 1997b 
Paraguay  1984, 1986, 1988, 1992   
Peru  1976, 1979, 1987   1970a, 1977a, 1978a, 1979a, 1982b, 1984a, 1993b, 1996b 
Uruguay  1982  1970a, 1972a, 1972f, 1975a, 1976a, 1976f, 1977a, 1979a, 1980a, 1981a, 1983a, 
1985a, 1990a, 1992a, 1996a, 1997a 
Venezuela  1984, 1986, 1989, 1994  1989b, 1996a 
Grenada  1978  1975a, 1979a, 1981a, 1983b 
Guyana  1987, 1989  1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1974f, 1975a, 1976a, 1978a, 1979b, 1980b, 
1990a, 1990c, 1994c 
Belize    1984a 
Jamaica  1978, 1983, 1990  1973a, 1974f, 1977a, 1978b, 1979b, 1981b, 1984a, 1987a, 1988a, 1990a, 1991a, 
1992b 
Trinidad & Tobago  1985, 1988, 1993  1989a, 1990a 
Cyprus    1980a 
Jordan  1983, 1987, 1989, 1992  1972f, 1973f, 1989a, 1992a, 1994b, 1996b 
Syrian Arab Republic  1977, 1982, 1988  1972f 
Egypt  1979, 1989  1973f, 1977a, 1978b, 1987a, 1991a, 1993b, 1996a 
Bangladesh  1975  1972f, 1974a, 1975a, 1979a, 1980b, 1983a, 1987c, 1990c 
Myanmar  1975, 1977  1973a, 1974a f, 1977a, 1978a, 1981a 
Sri Lanka  1977  1971a, 1972f, 1973f, 1974a f, 1977a, 1979b, 1983a, 1991c 
China, P.R.: Hong 
Kong 
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India  1976, 1991, 1995  1974f, 1981b, 1991a 
Indonesia  1978, 1983, 1986, 1997  1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1997a 
Korea  1980, 1997  1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1975a, 1977,80a, 1981a, 1983a, 1985a, 
1997a, 1997e 
Lao People’s D. R.  1995  1975f, 1980a, 1989c, 1993c 
Malaysia  1986, 1997   
Nepal  1975, 1981, 1984, 1991, 1995  1975a, 1985a, 1987c, 1992c 
Pakistan    1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1980b, 1981b, 1988a c, 1993a, 1994bc, 1995a, 1997bd 
Philippines  1983, 1986, 1997  1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a f, 1974a, 1975a, 1976bf, 1979a, 1980a, 1983a, 
1984a, 1986a, 1989b, 1991a, 1994b 
Singapore  1975   
Thailand  1981, 1984, 1997  1978a, 1981a, 1982a, 1985a 
Botswana  1984, 1996   
Burundi  1976, 1983,1986, 1989, 1997  1970a, 1972f, 1976a, 1986c, 1991c 
Cameroon  1982, 1984, 1994  1980a, 1988a, 1991a, 1994a, 1995a, 1997d  
Equatorial Guinea  1991, 1994  1980a, 1985a, 1988c, 1993c 
Ethiopia  1992  1981a, 1992c, 1996d 
Ghana  1978, 1983, 1986  1979a, 1983a, 1984a, 1986a, 1987bc, 1988c, 1995d 
Guinea-Bissau  1991, 1996  1974f, 1982a, 1986a, 1987a, 1987c, 1991c, 1995c, 1997d 
Kenya  1975, 1981, 1985, 1993, 1995, 1997  1975b, 1978a, 1979a, 1980a, 1982a, 1985a, 1988a c, 1989c, 1993c, 1996c 
Madagascar  1984, 1986, 1991, 1994  1977a, 1980a, 1981a, 1982a, 1984a, 1985a, 1986a, 1987c, 1988a, 1989c, 1996d 
Malawi  1982, 1985, 1992, 1994  1979a, 1980a, 1982a, 1983b, 1988a c, 1994a, 1995cd, 
Mali  1993  1971a, 1982a, 1985a, 1988a c, 1992c, 1996d 
Mauritius  1979  1978a, 1979a, 1980a, 1981a, 1983a 
Morocco  1983, 1990  1971a, 1976f, 1980b, 1981b, 1982a, 1983a, 1985a, 1988a, 1990a, 1992a 
Mozambique  1993, 1995  1987c, 1990c, 1996d 
Nigeria  1986, 1989, 1992  1987a, 1989a, 1991a 
Zimbabwe  1982, 1991, 1994, 1997  1981a, 1983a, 1992bc  
Sierra Leone  1988, 1990, 1997  1976f, 1977a, 1979a, 1981b, 1984a, 1986c, 1994c 
Swaziland  1975, 1979, 1982, 1984   
Tunisia  1993  1970a, 1986a, 1988b 
Uganda  1981, 1987, 1989  1970a, 1976f, 1980a, 1981a, 1982a, 1983a, 1987c, 1989c, 1994c, 1997d 
Zambia  1985, 1994  1972f, 1973a, 1975f, 1976a, 1978a, 1981b, 1983a, 1984a, 1986a, 1995c 
Fiji  1986  1974a 
 
1  Currency crises defined by criteria described in text, with 24-month exclusion windows imposed. 
2  IMF programs: 
  a Stand By and Extended Stand By Agreements (SBA). 
  b Extended Fund Facility (EFF). 
  c Structural Adjustment Facility and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). 
  d Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 
  e Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF). 
  f Contingency and Compensatory Fund Facility (CCFF).  41 
Appendix Table 3 
Participation Equation in short-term IMF programs – Probit Estimation Results 
    Dependent Variable: approval of short-term IMF programs  
Variables  Partial derivatives 
Constant  -0.165** 
(-2.21) 
Post-1979 Dummy  0.031 
(0.54) 




































Africa dummy  -0.154*** 
(-2.99) 
Asia dummy  -0.120** 
(-2.34) 
Latin America dummy  0.005 
(0.10) 
Autocracy  0.001 
(0.25) 
Number of observations  862 
Log likelihood function  -388.90 
Significance level  0.000 
Goodness-of-fit (10% cutoff) 
% of observations correctly called   32 
% of IMF programs correctly called   96 
% of no program correctly called          17 
Goodness-of-fit (25% cutoff) 
% of observations correctly called          71 
% of IMF programs correctly called          34 
% of no program correctly called          80 
 